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Abstract
Distributed constraint optimization problems (DCOPs) are important in many areas of computer
science and optimization. In a DCOP, each variable is controlled by one of many autonomous
agents, who together have the joint goal of maximizing a global objective function. A wide variety
of techniques have been explored to solve such problems, and here we focus on one of the main
families, namely iterative approximate best-response algorithms used as local search algorithms
for DCOPs. We define these algorithms as those in which, at each iteration, agents communicate
only the states of the variables under their control to their neighbours on the constraint graph, and
that reason about their next state based on the messages received from their neighbours. These
algorithms include the distributed stochastic algorithm and stochastic coordination algorithms,
the maximum-gain messaging algorithms, the families of fictitious play and adaptive play
algorithms, and algorithms that use regret-based heuristics. This family of algorithms is commonly
employed in real-world systems, as they can be used in domains where communication is difficult
or costly, where it is appropriate to trade timeliness off against optimality, or where hardware
limitations render complete or more computationally intensive algorithms unusable. However,
until now, no overarching framework has existed for analyzing this broad family of algorithms,
resulting in similar and overlapping work being published independently in several different
literatures. The main contribution of this paper, then, is the development of a unified analytical
framework for studying such algorithms. This framework is built on our insight that when
formulated as non-cooperative games, DCOPs form a subset of the class of potential games. This
result allows us to prove convergence properties of iterative approximate best-response algorithms
developed in the computer science literature using game-theoretic methods (which also shows that
such algorithms can also be applied to the more general problem of finding Nash equilibria in
potential games), and, conversely, also allows us to show that many game-theoretic algorithms can
be used to solve DCOPs. By so doing, our framework can assist system designers by making the
pros and cons of, and the synergies between, the various iterative approximate best-response
DCOP algorithm components clear.
1 This research was undertaken as part of the ALADDIN (Autonomous Learning Agents for Decentralised
Data and Information Systems) project and is jointly funded by BAE Systems and EPSRC (Engineering and
Physical Sciences Research Council) strategic partnership (EP/C548051/1).1 Introduction
In real-world applications, large-scale systems are difficult to optimally configure, often because
communication restrictions, organizational structures and/or complicated topologies make it
difficult, costly, or impossible to collect all the necessary information at a location where a
solution can be computed. This, in turn, motivates the use of distributed methods of optimization
in order to find the optimal configuration. In particular, in this paper, we concentrate on multi-
agent systems—that is, systems in which control is distributed across a set of autonomous
agents—as an important approach to distributed optimization. Within this context, we focus
specifically on distributed constraint optimization problems (DCOPs), a broad family of problems
that can be brought to bear on many domains, including: disaster response scenarios (e.g. Kitano
et al., 1999; Chapman et al., 2009), wide-area surveillance and distributed sensor network man-
agement (e.g. Hayajneh & Abdallah, 2004; Heikkinen, 2006; Kho et al., 2009), industrial task
allocation and scheduling problems (e.g. Zhang & Xing, 2002; Stranjak et al., 2008), and the
management of congested air, road, rail, and information networks (e.g. van Leeuwen et al., 2002;
Roughgarden, 2005).
In more detail, in a constraint satisfaction problem, the aim is to find a configuration of
states of variables such that they satisfy a set of constraints. A constraint optimization problem is
then given by a utility function that aggregates the payoffs for satisfying each of a set of ‘soft’
constraints (or, conversely, a penalty for violating constraints) over the states of variables in the
problem (Schiex et al., 1995). A distributed constraint optimisation problem arises when a number
of independent agents each control the state of (a subset of) the variables in the system, with the
joint aim of maximizing the global reward for satisfying constraints. A natural way to model
DCOPs, then, is as a multi-agent system.
As a consequence of the breadth of applications of DCOPs, many algorithms for solving them
have been developed using a number of approaches, which often differ according to the literatures
they were first proposed in (e.g. the computer science, game theory, machine learning, or statistical
physics literatures). It is our intention, then, to provide a unifying framework for analyzing a
broad class of DCOP algorithms. However, here we exclude from our analysis centralized
approaches in which all of the information needed to solve the DCOP is directly accessible to,
and/or in which all of the variables in a system come under the control of, a single decision maker,
as assumed within algorithms such as the breakout algorithm (Morris, 1993) and arc consistency
(Cooper et al., 2007), among others (see Apt (2003), for more examples from the broader constraint
programming literature). While such approaches are certainly useful in a range of scenarios, we
make this exclusion because we are particularly interested in algorithms for multi-agent systems, in
which the actors are distributed and can only communicate with their peers. The remaining
algorithms are known as distributed algorithms, and, for our purposes, we define three further
sub-groupings:
> Distributed complete algorithms, by which we mean algorithms that always find a configuration
of variables that maximizes the global objective function (as in finite domains one always exists).
This class includes ADOPT (Asynchronous Distributed OPTimization; Modi et al., 2005),
DPOP (Dynamic Programming OPtimization; Petcu and Faltings, 2005), and APO (Asynchronous
Partial Overlay; Mailler and Lesser, 2006). Due to the inherent computational complexity of
DCOPs, complete algorithms always run exponential in some aspect of their operation (i.e. the
number or size of messages exchanged, or the computation performed by the agents).
Furthermore, distributed complete algorithms usually operate by passing complicated data
structures, or run on a highly structured ordering, such as a spanning tree, and often require
additional processing of the original constraint graph.
> Local iterative message-passing algorithms, such as max-sum (Aji & McEliece, 2000) or distributed
arc consistency (Cooper et al., 2007). In these algorithms, neighbouring agents exchange messages
comprising a data structure that contains the values of different local variable configurations, and
use these values to construct new messages to pass on to other agents.
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(Tel, 2000; Fitzpatrick & Meertens, 2003), the maximum-gain messaging algorithm (Yokoo &
Hirayama, 1996; Maheswaran et al., 2005), fictitious play (Brown, 1951; Robinson, 1951),
adaptive play (Young, 1993, 1998), and regret matching (Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000). In this class,
agents exchange messages containing only their state, or can observe the strategies of their
neighbours. In game-theoretic parlance, this is known as standard monitoring
2, and, as the name
suggests, is a typical informational assumption implicit in the literature on learning in games.
In this paper, we refer to the last two groups together as local iterative algorithms (see the
taxonomy in Figure 1), to differentiate them from their complete counterparts
3. We group them
under this term because both classes operate only at the local level, with messages exchanged
between neighbouring agents at each iteration of the algorithm, and without any overarching
structure controlling the timing or ordering of messages.
In many real distributed systems, we find that local iterative algorithms are often preferred over
distributed complete algorithms
4. This is because, in such domains, it is necessary and appropriate
to trade solution quality off against timeliness or communication overhead. For example, in real-
time target tracking it may be more important to produce a good solution quickly, rather than
wait for the optimal solution. This is the reasoning Krainin et al. (2007) invoke to motivate their
use of the local iterative algorithm to coordinate scan schedules in a real meteorological radar
network. Similarly, in remote and mobile sensor management, an algorithm that has a low
communication overhead may be preferred because of the large drain on a sensor’s battery charge
caused by communication, as evidenced by the choice of algorithm used in many problems in
distributed sensor networks (e.g. Zhang et al., 2005; Farinelli et al., 2008) and multi-robot
cooperative data fusion problems (e.g. Matthews & Durrant-Whyte, 2006; Stranders et al., 2009).
Furthermore, in some real distributed systems, hardware limitations may outright prohibit the
use of distributed complete algorithms. For example, when using DPOP the capacity of the
communication buffer of a typical sensor node is quickly exceeded as a problem grows in size,
because the message size is exponential in the induced width of the communication tree (e.g. Petcu
& Faltings, 2005; Rogers et al., 2009). Similarly, the number of messages exchanged in ADOPT is
exponential in the height of the communication tree, and in APO, the mediator agents are required
to perform computations, which grow exponentially in the size of the portion of the problem they
are responsible for. Such exponential relationships are simply unacceptable in embedded devices
that exhibit constrained computation, bandwidth, and memory resources. On the other hand, in
these settings, it is clear that local algorithms are more effective, because the quality of the
solutions they produce are typically satisfactory (even if they are not optimal), and they perform
favourably in terms of the issues of scalability mentioned above.
2 Cf. partial monitoring, as in multi-armed Bandit problems. See Blum and Mansour (2007) for a discussion
of the issues surrounding these two monitoring models.
3 Note that, when applied to DCOPs, many approaches to distributed optimization usually can be placed
into one of the three categories defined above. For example, many negotiation models and local exchange
markets are, in effect, local approximate best-response algorithms. Consider a negotiation model in which at
each time step one agent in each neighbourhood announces a new configuration of the variables under its
control to its neighbours, with the constraint that each new configuration weakly improves the agent’s payoff
(as is commonly employed). This type of negotiation model is captured by our framework, as messages are
local (only neighbours receive the agent’s update to its state) and the process is iterative. We also point out
that other approaches to the general problem of distributed optimization that can be applied to DCOPs, such
as token-passing (e.g. Xu et al., 2005) or auction protocols (e.g. Gerkey & Mataric, 2002), do not fall into any
of these three categories. However, we consider an exhaustive classification and analysis of these distributed
optimization techniques outside the scope of this paper, because we are primarily concerned with local
approximate best-response algorithms in the specific case of DCOPs.
4 The complete algorithms are typically used in applications where their optimality is the key concern and
timeliness is not a limiting factor, such as industrial scheduling and timetabling problems (Petcu & Faltings,
2005) or routing protocols for fixed environmental sensor networks (Kho et al., 2009).
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the entire framework of local message-passing algorithms have been extensively analyzed, with
guarantees placed on their solutions under a range of assumptions, for example, for tree structured
(Aji & McEliece, 2000) or single-looped constraint graphs (Weiss, 2000). In contrast, no such
unifying and categorizing framework has existed for local iterative algorithms until now. One reason
for this is because, broadly speaking, these algorithms originate from two different literatures; either
they are learning or adaptive processes taken from game theory or they are distributed versions of
centralized procedures developed for traditional constraint optimization problems or heuristic
search methods taken from computer science. In more detail (centralized), constraint optimization
problems evolved, in part, as a method for analyzing over-constrained constraint satisfaction
problems. As such, traditional computer science approaches to such problems include the breakout
algorithm, arc consistency, dynamic programming, and stochastic optimization techniques. Con-
sequently, a traditional computer science approach to solving DCOPs, which includes many local
approximate best-response algorithms, starts by developing distributed versions of these centralized
algorithms. For example, distributed breakout (Hirayama & Yokoo, 2005) and maximum-gain
messaging (Maheswaran et al., 2005) are two local approximate best-response algorithms that
descend from the breakout algorithm, and distributed versions of simulated annealing have been
developed for DCOPs (Fitzpatrick & Meertens, 2003; Arshad & Silaghi, 2003), which also fall into
the category of local approximate best-response algorithms. On the other hand, from a game-
theoretic perspective, in a DCOP, each autonomous agent’s aim is to maximize its own private utility
function through its independent choice of state. From this point of view, each agent’s optimal
choice is strategically dependent on the actions of its neighbouring agents (a perspective on DCOPs
first adopted by Maheswaran et al., 2004), and distributed algorithms for solving such problems is
the focus of the literature of learning in games (e.g. Fudenberg & Levine, 1998). However, what is
common to both of these literatures is that the techniques used are all local, iterative, approximate
best-response algorithms, in which agents exchange messages containing only their state, and which
typically converge to local optima (or Nash equilibria); and it is game theory that has the tools and
terminology to analyze algorithms that operate in such settings. In particular, we stress that, in
giving up global optimality, we consider the set of local optima, or equivalently, Nash equilibria, to
be the appropriate solution concept for this class of algorithm. This is because this set represents the
stable configurations of variables that can be reached by exchanging messages that contain only an
agent’s state (i.e. the information in the messages circulated in all of the algorithms in this class
defines the appropriate solution concept).
Against this background, the main contribution of this paper is the first unifying analytical
framework for studying iterative approximate best-response algorithms that are used to solve both
DCOPs and potential games. Our framework is based on a problem formulation known as a
hypergraphical game (Papadimitriou & Roughgarden, 2008) and convergence results regarding the
class of potential games (Monderer & Shapley, 1996b). Specifically, we show that a hypergraphical
Distributed Constraint Optimisation Algorithms
Local iterative algorithms Distributed complete algorithms
(e.g. DPOP, ADOPT, APO)
Message passing algorithms
(e.g. max–sum, arc consistency)
Approximate best response algorithms
Local search algorithms
(Computer science)
Adaptive learning heuristics
(Game theory)
Figure 1 Taxonomy of the categories of algorithms considered in this paper, with the focus, local iterative
approximate best-response algorithms, in bold.
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this is the case for all DCOPs. We then use this framework to develop a novel parameterization of
iterative approximate best-response DCOP algorithms. In order to populate this parameterization,
we decompose algorithms proposed in both the game theory and computer science literatures in
such a way so as to identify categories of substitutable components. We then analyze how these
components affect the convergence properties of an algorithm employing them, using convergence
analysis techniques developed specifically for potential games. As such, our framework can be
applied to potential games generally. However, due to the fact that we are considering these
algorithms as distributed optimization tools, we restrict the larger part of our discussion to the
specific case of DCOP games.
In more detail, in this paper, we advance the state of the art in the following ways:
1. We derive a general result regarding hypergraphical potential games, which states that a
hypergraphical game is a potential game if each of the local games is a potential game.
2. Building upon a game-theoretic formulation of DCOPs (introduced by Maheswaran et al.,
2004), we show that, as a consequence of the above result, DCOP games form a subset of
potential games. This allows us to apply established methods for analyzing algorithms from
game theory to existing algorithms produced by the computer science community, employing
the Nash equilibrium condition as the relevant solution concept.
3. We develop an overarching framework that encompasses many local approximate best-response
DCOP algorithms, in which we decompose the algorithms into three components: (i) a state
evaluation, in the form of a target function; (ii) a decision rule, mapping from target function to a
choice of state; and (iii) an adjustment schedule, controlling which agent updates its state when.
This framework allows us to elucidate, for the first time, the relationships between the various
algorithms in the form of a parameterization of the local iterative DCOP algorithm design space.
At present, various algorithms from the different disciplines use different terms for the same
concepts, and are largely developed without awareness of the many similarities between them
5.
4. By constructing such a unified view, we are able to uncover synergies that arise as a result of
combining various approaches (e.g. using a particular target function and decision rule in order
to reduce the communication requirement of an algorithm), and identify trade-offs in the
behaviour produced by different components (e.g. choosing between adjustment schedules to
produce either a slower, but anytime, algorithm, or one that converges quicker on average).
The analysis described above gives a multi-agent system designer the information needed to tailor
a DCOP algorithm to their particular requirements, whether they be high quality solutions, rapid
convergence, asynchronous execution, or low communication costs. Moreover, such a unified
approach to analyzing local approximate best-response DCOP algorithms is valuable in itself,
because it makes the pros and cons of the various algorithm configurations clear. Now, while this is
our primary motivation, a secondary motivation is that, by stating different approaches in terms of a
common framework, we can reconcile the differences in terminology that exist across the various
disciplines investigating DCOPs. This, we believe, is a significant hindrance to progress in this field,
and one which a unified approach can start to remove. Furthermore, we believe that our framework
provides an important step towards greater use of a common specification of other problems that
are examined by both the computer science and game theory communities, such as multi-agent
resource and task allocation problems or the management of congested networks.
5 One notable exception to this trend is Marden et al. (2009a), who illustrate the connections between
potential games and consensus problems. In a consensus problem, a set of agents must reach consensus upon a
given value (such as a meeting point). These problems may be modelled as a DCOP containing binary and
unary constraints. Each binary constraint between two agents is satisfied when their variables are set to the
same value, and violations are penalized in proportion to their distance between their variables’ values.
However, an agent’s strategy set may be limited by its unary constraints such that it is not possible for it to
simultaneously satisfy all its binary constraints.
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introduce the notation of non-cooperative games, state the Nash equilibrium solution concept for
games, describe hypergraphical games, and characterize the class of potential games and their
associated properties. Then, as a first step in developing our framework of the local approximate
best-response DCOP algorithm design space, we show that DCOPs are potential games. Using this
result, in Section 3 we populate our parameterization of the algorithm design space with com-
ponents of algorithms taken from the literatures on local search for DCOPs and learning in games.
In Section 4 we discuss the connections between, and overlapping features of, game-theoretic
algorithms and local approximate best-response algorithms developed by computer scientists
specifically for solving DCOPs. In more detail, by characterizing DCOPs as potential games,
convergence to Nash equilibrium of the game-theoretic algorithms considered here is guaranteed.
Moreover, by drawing correspondences between the game-theoretic algorithms and those developed
specifically for DCOPs, these guarantees may be applied to the convergence of DCOP algorithms.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings and discusses directions for future work.
2 Distributed constraint optimization problems as potential games
In this section we show that DCOPs, when viewed from a game theory perspective (as introduced
by Maheswaran et al., 2004), form a subset of the class of potential games, a useful class of games
with several properties desirable to the designer of a multi-agent system. Given this insight, we can
bring together the two sets of algorithms—taken from game theory and computer science—and
analyze them under a single framework, using results regarding the class of potential games. To
this end, we begin this section with an overview of DCOPs. We then introduce non-cooperative
games and the hypergraphical game representation, in which a large game is reduced to a bipartite
graph composed of agents connected to smaller local games. In the specific context of DCOPs,
these local games correspond to constraints. We then focus on potential games, and in particular,
we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a hypergraphical game to be a potential game
is that each of its local games are potential games. Now, the natural way to express constraints in a
DCOP is as team games, which are a specific type of potential game. An important consequence of
this is that DCOP games form a subset of potential games. Thus, game-theoretic techniques used to
analyze algorithms in potential games can be used to analyze DCOP algorithms. This insight is used
in subsequent sections, where components of our algorithm parameterization are analyzed using
such techniques.
2.1 Constraint optimization problems
A constraint optimization problem is represented by a set of variables V5{v1, v2, y}, each of which
may take one of a finite number of states or values, sjASj, a set of constraints C5{c1, c2, y}, and a
global utility function, ug, that specifies preferences over configurations of states of variables in the
system. A constraint c5/Vc, RcS is defined over a set of variables Vc C V and a relation between
those variables, Rc, which is a subset of the Cartesian product of the domains of each variable
involved in the constraint, Pvj2VcSj. A simple example is a binary constraint of the type typically
invoked in graph colouring problems, where the relation between the two variables involved, j and
k, is given by the rule that if vj5s then vk6¼s. A function that specifies the reward for satisfying, or
penalty for violating, a constraint is written uckðsckÞ, where sck is the configuration of states of the
variables Vck.
Using this, the global utility function aggregating the utilities from satisfying or violating
constraints takes the form:
ugðsÞ¼uc1ðsc1Þ     uckðsckÞ     uclðsclÞ;
where " is a commutative and associative binary operator. Now, as we are trying to generate a
preference ordering over outcomes, we would like to ensure that an increase in the number of
satisfied constraints results in an increase in the global utility. That is, the aggregation operator
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choice of operator affects the range of values that the ui can take. For example, if " is multi-
plication, the values of ui must be elements of R
þ,o ri f" is addition, the values of ui may be
elements of R. Either approach will generate a suitable ordering, however, from here on we will
take the common approach of using additive aggregation functions:
ugðsÞ¼
X
ck2C
uckðsÞ: ð1Þ
Constraints may be ascribed different levels of importance by simply weighting the rewards for
satisfying them, or by using a positive monotonic transform of constraint reward (Schiex et al.,
1995). The objective is then to find a global configuration of variable states, s*, such that
s
l 2 argmax
s2S
ugðsÞ:
It is also possible to include hard constraints in this formalization of DCOPs. This is achieved by
augmenting the additive global utility function with a multiplicative element that captures the hard
constraints:
ugðsÞ¼
Y
hck2HC
uhckðsÞ
X
sck2SC
usckðsÞ
 !
;
where HC and SC are the set of hard and soft constraints, respectively, and where the payoff for
satisfying each hard constraint is 1, and 0 if the hard constraint is violated. The consequence is that
if any of the hard constraints are violated the global utility is 0, while if all of the hard constraints
are satisfied the global utility increases with the number of soft constraints satisfied. One downside
to including hard constraints in this manner is that the strict monotonicity of ug(s) is lost, meaning
that a change in a variable’s state may satisfy additional constraints, but not increase the global
utility. If this is the case, it implies that the global utility possesses many local, sub-optimal stable
points that are only quasi-local maxima.
2.2 Distributed constraint optimization problems
A DCOP is produced when a set of autonomous agents each independently control the state of a
subset of the variables of a constraint optimization problem, but share the goal of maximizing the
rewards for satisfying constraints (i.e. they aim to jointly maximize ug(s)). For pedagogical value,
and without loss of generality, we consider the case where each agent controls only one variable.
We notate the set of agents involved in a constraint by Nc, and the set of constraints in which i is
involved is Ci. Each agent has a private utility function, ui(s), which is dependent on both its own
state and the state of all agents that are linked to any constraint cACi. We call these agents i’s
neighbours, notated v(i), and notate those neighbours involved in a specific constraint ck as nckðiÞ.
The simplest and, arguably, most natural, choice of utility function in DCOP is to set each agent
i’s utility to the sum of the payoffs for constraints that it is involved in:
uiðsÞ¼
X
ck2Ci
uckðsi;snckðiÞÞ: ð2Þ
Now, each agent’s choice of strategy is guided by its desire to maximize its private utility, but this
utility is strategically dependent on the strategies of its neighbours. In order to analyze such a
system, we use the tools and terminology of non-cooperative game theory.
2.3 Non-cooperative games
A non-cooperative game, G5/N,{ Si, ui}iANS, is comprised of a set of agents N51,y,n, and
for each agent iAN, a set of strategies Si,w i t h N
i¼1Si ¼ S,a n dautility function ui : S ! R. Note
that, in the context of DCOPs, we can use si to represent the ‘state of a variable’ and ‘strategy of an
agent’ interchangeably. A joint-strategy profile sAS is referred to as an outcome of the game,
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they receive for an outcome by the condition that, if and only if the agent prefers outcome s to
outcome s0, then ui(s).ui(s0). That is, each agent’s utility function ranks their preferences over
outcomes. We will often use the notation s5{si, s2i}, where s2i is the complimentary set of si.
In non-cooperative games, it is assumed that an agent’s goal is to maximize its own payoff,
conditional on the choices of its opponents. A best-response correspondence, bi(s2i), is the set of agent
i’s optimal strategies, given the strategy profile of its opponents, biðs iÞ¼argmaxsi2Sifuiðsi;s iÞg.
Stable points in such a system are characterized by the set of Nash equilibria.
DEFINITION 1 A joint-strategy profile, s*, such that no individual agent has an incentive to change to
a different strategy, is a Nash equilibrium:
uiðs
l
i ;s
l
 iÞ uiðsi;s
l
 iÞ 0 8 si; 8 i: ð3Þ
In a Nash equilibrium, each agent plays a best response: sl
i 2 biðsl
 iÞ for all iAN. As such, in a
game where agents independently choose which strategy to adopt, a Nash equilibrium is a stable
point where no individual agent has an incentive to change their strategy.
We can also define a strict Nash equilibrium, which is a necessary component of many proofs of
convergence in game theory, by replacing the inequality in Equation (3) with a strict inequality.
The implication of this substitution is that in a strict Nash equilibrium, no agent is indifferent
between their equilibrium strategy and another strategy, which is not the case in a Nash equili-
brium. This also leads us to a definition of non-degenerate games. In general, a non-degenerate
game is one for which in every mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, all agents mix over the same
number of pure strategies. When considering pure-strategy Nash equilibria, non-degeneracy
means that for any pure-strategy equilibrium profile of its opponents, an agent’s best-response
correspondence contains only one strategy. Consequently, all pure-strategy Nash equilibria in
non-degenerate games are strict. Note that this condition does not exclude the possibility of a
game possessing multiple Nash equilibria. Rather, it ensures that at most one equilibrium exists
for each of an agent’s pure strategies.
2.4 Hypergraphical games
In DCOPs, an agent’s utility is a function of the constraints in which it is involved, and is only
dependent on its own and its neighbours’ states: that is, ui(si, sv(i)). Therefore, we can model a
DCOP game using a compact representation known as a hypergraphical game. In more detail,
hypergraphical games are a model used to represent non-cooperative games that have strict
independences between players’ utility functions (Papadimitriou & Roughgarden, 2008). In this
model, the independences in the agents’ utility functions are used to decompose an n-player global
game into local games, each involving fewer players. This decomposition can be thought of as a
bipartite graph, in which one set of nodes corresponds to the set of players and the other repre-
sents the games played between them. Then, any agent i whose strategy affects others players’
payoffs in a particular local game is connected to that local game node. This representation is
more compact than the standard normal form whenever the global game can be factored into
sufficiently many local games, and when the maximum number of neighbours an agent has, k,
can be bounded k5n, it is exponentially smaller than the standard form (Papadimitriou &
Roughgarden, 2008).
Formally, a hypergraphical game comprises a set of local games: G5{g1, g2,y,gm}. Each
local game is a tuple g ¼h Ng;fSi;u
g
igi2Ngi, where N
gDN is the set of agents playing g and
u
g
i : [i2NgSi ! R is the payoff to i from its involvement in g. For each player, Si is identical
for each game, and player i chooses one strategy to play in all of the local games it is involved in
(i.e. i plays the same strategy in each local game). As in DCOPs, agent i’s neighbours, v(i), are the
agents with whom agent i shares a local game node, with those neighbours involved in a specific
local game g notated v
g(i). Agents are usually involved in more than one local game, with the set of
418 A. C. CHAPMAN ET AL.local games in which i is involved denoted Gi. Agent i’s total payoff for each strategy is given by the
sum of payoffs from each local game it is involved in:
uiðsi;s iÞ¼
X
g2Gi
u
g
iðsi;sngðiÞÞ:
In the context of DCOPs, each constraint is modelled by a local game, and agents are linked to the
local games corresponding to their constraints. Each agent’s utility then is given by the sum of the
utilities from constraints that it is involved in (as in Equation 2).
More generally, the hypergraphical game model generalizes the model of factor graphs
(Kschischang et al., 2001). Factor graphs can be used to represent DCOPs, as well as graphical
probability models such as Bayesian networks and Markov random fields. In both the factor graph
and hypergraphical game models, each variable node comes under the control of an agent, and,
typically, the global utility to be optimized is the sum or product of each agent’s utility
6. The
difference between the models lies in what the hyperedges represent. In factor graphs, a hyperedge
(factor node) represents a single valued function, which is its contribution to the utility of the agents
it contains. In contrast, each hyperedge in a hypergraphical game represents an arbitrary non-
cooperative game, in which agents’ payoffs may differ. In other words, a factor graph is a special
case of a hypergraphical game in which each local game gives an identical payoff to all the agents
involved
7: that is, local games in a DCOP are team games, which are a subclass of potential games.
2.5 Potential games
The class of potential games is characterized as those games that admit a function specifying the
participant’s joint preference over outcomes (Monderer & Shapley, 1996b). This function is
known as a potential function and, generally, it is a real-valued function on the joint-strategy
space (the Cartesian product of all agents’ strategy spaces), defined such that the change in a
unilaterally deviating players utility is matched by the change in the potential function. A potential
function has a natural interpretation as representing opportunities for improvement to a player
defecting from any given strategy profile. As the potential function incorporates the strategic
possibilities of all players simultaneously, the local optima of the potential function are Nash
equilibria of the game; that is, the potential function is maximized by self-interested agents in a
system. Importantly, we will show that the global utility function acts as a potential for a DCOP
game. We now formalize some of the key concepts related to potential games.
DEFINITION 2 (Potential Games). A function P : S ! R is a potential for a game if
Pðsi;s iÞ Pðs0
i;s iÞ¼uiðsi;s iÞ uiðs0
i;s iÞ8 si; s0
i 2 Si 8 i 2 N:
A game is called a potential game if it admits a potential.
Intuitively, a potential is a function of action profiles such that the difference induced by a
unilateral deviation equals the change in the deviator’s payoff.
The usefulness of potential games lies in the fact that the existence of a potential function for a
game implies a strict joint preference ordering over game outcomes. This, in turn, ensures that the
game possesses a number of particularly desirable properties, which we will use to analyze the
behaviour of various algorithms in the coming sections.
THEOREM 3 (Monderer & Shapley, 1996b). Every finite potential game possesses at least one
pure-strategy equilibrium.
6 Generally, any optimization problem that forms a commutative semi-ring can be expressed as a bipartite
factor graph—see Aji and McEliece (2000) for details.
7 Indeed, this result holds for any problem that can be represented as a factor graph and in which the
variable domains are finite.
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local maxima of P. That is, s is an equilibrium point for G if and only if for every iAN,
PðsÞ Pðs0
i;s iÞ8 s0
i 2 Si:
Consequently, if P admits a maximal value in S (which is true by definition for a finite S), then P
possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. &
Now, pure-strategy Nash equilibria are particularly desirable in decentralized agent-based
systems, as they imply a stable, unique outcome. Additionally, strict Nash equilibria must be pure
by definition. Mixed-strategy equilibria, on the other hand, imply a stationary, probabilistically
variable equilibrium strategy profile. Also note that it is likely that more than one Nash equilibrium
exists, and that some of those Nash equilibria will be sub-optimal.
Building on this, a step in a game G is a change in one player’s strategy. An improvement step in
G is a change in one player’s strategy such that its utility is improved. A path in G is a sequence of
steps, f5(s
0, s
1,y,s
t y), in which exactly one player changes their strategy at each step t. A path
has an initial point, s
0, and if it is of finite length T,aterminal point s
T. A path f is an improvement
path in G if for all t, ui(s
t21),ui(s
t) for the deviating player i at step t. A game G is said to have the
finite improvement property if every improvement path is finite.
THEOREM 4 (Monderer & Shapley, 1996b). Every improvement path in an ordinal potential game
is finite.
Proof. For every improvement path f5(s
0, s
1, s
2, y) we have, by Equation (2):
Pðs0ÞoPðs1ÞoPðs2Þo   
Then, as S is a finite set, the sequence f must be finite. &
The finite improvement property ensures that the behaviour of agents who play ‘better responses’
in each period of the repeated game converges to a Nash equilibrium in finite time. Taken together,
these properties ensure that a number of simple adaptive processes converge to a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the game (as discussed further for specific algorithms in Section 4).
Using the definitions above, we can construct a mapping between potential and hypergraphical
games. To begin with, we note that Young (1998) shows that if every pairwise utility dependency
corresponds to a bimatrix potential game between two agents, then the entire game is a potential
game. Building on this, we generalize Young’s result to hypergraphical potential games comprising
several n-player games, a result upon which the rest of the paper hinges.
THEOREM 5 A hypergraphical game G is a potential game if every local game g is a potential game.
Proof. Sufficiency is shown by constructing a potential function for the hypergraphical game G.
Each local game g has a potential P
g(s), so a potential for the entire game, P, can be constructed
by aggregating the potentials of the local games:
PðsÞ¼
X
g2G
PgðsÞ:
Now, given a strategy profile s, a change in a deviating player i’s payoff is captured by changes in
the values of potential functions, P
g(s), of the local games i is involved in, Gi, so the following
statements hold:
uiðsi;snðiÞÞ uiðs0
i;snðiÞÞ¼
X
g2Gi
u
g
iðsi;sngðiÞÞ 
X
g2Gi
u
g
iðs0
i;sngðiÞÞ
¼
X
g2G
Pgðsi;s iÞ 
X
g2G
Pgðs0
i;s iÞ
¼ Pðsi;s iÞ Pðs0
i;s iÞ;
ð4Þ
where the second line flows from the first because the potential function between independent
agents is a constant value, and the third line flows from the second by definition. &
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potential. In Section 2.6 we will use a specific instance of Theorem 5 to show that DCOP games
are potential games. This result uses the fact that team games are a subclass of potential games.
Formally, a team game is a game in which all agents share a common payoff function, and this
common payoff function is a potential for the game: that is, u
g
iðsgÞ¼PgðsgÞ8iAN.
2.6 Distributed constraint optimization problems as graphical potential games
In Equation (2), we defined agents’ utilities such that all agents involved in a constraint receive
the same reward from that constraint; in other words, each constraint game is a team game.
Consequently, we can make the following remark, which is a corollary of Theorem 5.
COROLLARY 6 Every DCOP game in which the agents’ private utilities are the sum of their constraint
utilities is a potential game.
As per Theorem 5, a potential for such a DCOP game can be constructed by aggregating the local
(team) games’ potential functions. Of course, this is exactly the global utility function ug, specified
in Equation (1). Now, for completeness, observe that, because a change in i’s strategy only affects
the neighbours of i, v(i), the following statements hold:
uiðsi;snðiÞÞ uiðs0
i;snðiÞÞ¼
X
ck2Ci
uckðsi;snðiÞÞ 
X
ck2Ci
uckðs0
i;snðiÞÞ
¼
X
ck2C
uckðsi;s iÞ 
X
ck2C
uckðs0
i;s iÞ
¼ ugðsi;s iÞ ugðs0
i;s iÞ:
ð5Þ
Thus, any change in state that increases an agent’s private utility also increases the global utility of
the system
8.
Now, when the scenario requires employing a local approximate best-response algorithm, the
solution to a DCOP game is produced by the independent actions of the agents in the system.
These solutions are located at stable points in the game; that is, for this class of algorithms, the
Nash equilibria of the DCOP game characterize the set of solutions to the constraint optimization
problem. We have shown that DCOP games are potential games, so we are assured that at least
one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Furthermore, the globally optimal strategy profile
corresponds to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, because it is a maximum of the potential. We
emphasize that in most DCOPs many Nash equilibria exist, and furthermore, many of those will
be sub-optimal. This is particularly the case when hard constraints are incorporated, because, as
noted earlier, the global utility function is likely to have many local quasi-maxima wherever a hard
constraint is violated.
Recently, however, quality guarantees on worst-case Nash equilibria and k-optima for DCOP
games have been derived for certain classes of DCOP games (Pearce & Tambe, 2007; Bowring
et al., 2008). In more detail, k-optima are a generalization of Nash equilibria, applicable only to
DCOPs, that are stable in the face of deviations of all teams of size k and less. The payoff to a
team, x is defined as
uxðsx;s xÞ¼
X
ck2Cx
uckðsx;s xÞ;
8 Tumer and Wolpert (2004) provide another method for showing that DCOP games are potential games.
Generally, any global utility function whose variables are controlled by independent agents can be instan-
tiated as a potential game by setting each agent’s utility function equal to its marginal effect on the global
utility (as in the alignment criterion above). Then, by definition, any change in an agent’s utility is matched by
an equivalent change in the global utility. In a DCOP, one way to achieve this is to set each agent’s utility to
the sum of the payoffs for constraints that it is involved in, as in Equation (2).
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involved in, counting each constraint only once. Nash equilibria are k-optima with k51, and every
(k11)-optimum is also a k-optimum, so every k-optima is a Nash equilibrium
9. The key result is
that the worst-case k-optimal solution improves as the value of k increases (i.e. as the maximum size
of the deviating coalitions considered increases). Given this, the worst-case k-optimum results can be
used to guarantee lower bounds on the solutions produced by some DCOP algorithms. However,
bounds only exist for k greater than or equal to the constraint arity of the problem, so bounds do
not exist for Nash equilibria in problems involving anything other than unary constraints.
We now present an example DCOP—a graph colouring game. We give this example because it
is often used as a canonical example in this domain, and it shows that complicated payoff
structures may be constructed by combining simple constraint games.
EXAMPLE 1 In graph colouring, neighbouring nodes share constraints, which are satisfied if the nodes
are in differing states. Consider the following graph colouring problem, where each node can be either
black or white, that is, Si5{B, W}, and the associated 232 constraint game:
A B
sC
sA BW
B (0, 0) (1, 1)
W (1, 1) (0, 0)
C
sC
sB BW
B( 0 , 0 ) ( 1 , 1 )
W( 1 , 1 ) ( 0 , 0 )
Now, in this example, agents A and B each effectively play the game above with agent C, while
agent C plays the composite game below, constructed by combining the constraint games it is playing
with each neighbour. In the tables below, A and B are column players and C is the row player. The top
table contains the payoffs (uA,u B,u C), and a potential for the game is given in the lower table:
sC
sA, sB B, B B, W W, B W, W
B (0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 2)
W (1, 1, 2) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0)
sC
sA, sB B, B B, W W, B W, W
B0 1 1 2
W2 1 1 0
In the above we have described the utility functions that define a DCOP game, the associated
solution concepts, and some important properties of DCOP games that flow from their classifi-
cation as potential games. However, what is not specified in the above formulation are the
processes by which agents adjust their states in order to arrive at a solution. These are the
algorithms used to solve the game, and are the topic of the next section. Before continuing,
however, we make one general comment regarding both the interpretation of the repeated game
and the strategy adaptation process. We interpret the agents as being involved in several rounds of
negotiation about the joint state of their variables before playing the DCOP game once. Alter-
natively, we could justify this perspective by assuming that the agents suffer from extreme myopia,
so that they do not look beyond the immediate rewards for taking an action, as is standard in
much of the literature on learning in repeated games. Either way, the only Nash equilibria that are
supported are the Nash equilibria of the one-shot DCOP game; that is, the Folk Theorem for
repeated games does not come into consideration.
9 Although Nash equilibria correspond to 1-optima, note that strong equilibria (Aumann, 1959) do not
correspond to n-optima. A strong equilibrium is robust to deviations from all coalitions of n players and less,
where a coalition deviates if at least one member’s individual payoff improves and none decrease. In a DCOP
game, an n-optimum always exists, while a strong equilibrium may not. However, if a strong equilibrium does
exist, it is n-optimal.
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optimization problems algorithms
In this section we describe the basic components of the main DCOP algorithms present in the
literature, including those developed for solving potential games, those developed for DCOPs
generally, and those designed to solve specific problems that may be represented by a DCOP. By
doing this, we open a way to investigate synergies that arise by combining seemingly disparate
approaches to solving DCOPs using local approximate best-response techniques. This is pursued
further in the next section, where we analyze how differences in the algorithms affect their
behaviour and the solutions they produce, and propose novel algorithms incorporating the best
features of each. However, first of all, an explication of the basic framework we use to analyze all
the algorithms and the design space is provided.
As noted above, in all the DCOP algorithms we discuss, agents act myopically, in that they only
consider the immediate effects of their actions (or state changes, see the discussion above). Given
an appropriate trigger, the individual agents follow the same basic two-stage routine, comprising
state evaluation, which produces some measure of the desirability of each state, followed by a
decision on which action to take, based on the preceding state evaluations. The system-wide
process that triggers an agent’s processes is given by an adjustment schedule, that controls which
agent adjusts its state at each point in time. In more detail:
State evaluation: Each algorithm has a target function that it uses to evaluate its prospective
states. The target functions are typically functions of payoffs, and sometimes take parameters that
are set exogenously to the system or updated online. Additionally, some algorithms may make use
of information about the past actions of agents to compute the value of the target function.
Decision rule: The decision rule refers to the procedure by which an agent uses its evaluation of
states to decide upon an action to take. Typically an algorithm prescribes that an agent selects
either the state that maximizes or minimizes the target function (depending on the target function
in question), or selects a state probabilistically, in proportion to the value of the target function for
that state.
Adjustment schedule: In many algorithms (particularly those addressed in the game theory
literature), the scheduling mechanism is often left unspecified, or is implicitly random. However,
some algorithms are identified by their use of specific adjustment schedules that allow for pre-
ferential adjustment or parallel execution. Furthermore, in some cases the adjustment schedule is
embedded in the decision stage of the algorithm.
Note that communication does not figure explicitly in this framework. Information is com-
municated between agents for two purposes: (i) to calculate the value of their target function, or
(ii) to run the adjustment schedule. Given this, the communication requirements of each algorithm
depend on the needs of these two stages. For example, algorithms that use random adjustment
protocols only transfer information between agents to calculate the value of their target function
(usually just their neighbours’ states), whereas in algorithms that use preferential adjustment
schedules (such as the maximum-gain messaging algorithm), additional information may be
required to run the adjustment schedule.
Given this background, this section examines the forms that each of the three algorithm stages
can take. In doing so, we make clear, for the first time, the many connections between the various
algorithms. During this section we will be referring to many algorithms from the literature on
DCOP algorithms and learning in games, the most important being:
> Best response and smooth best response (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998);
> Better-reply dynamics (Mezzetti & Friedman, 2001);
> DSA (Tel, 2000; Fitzpatrick & Meertens, 2003);
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> Adaptive play (Young, 1993) and spatial adaptive play (Young, 1998);
> Distributed simulated annealing (Arshad & Silaghi, 2003);
> Fictitious play (Brown, 1951; Robinson, 1951) and smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg & Kreps,
1993; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998);
> Joint-strategy fictitious play (JSFP; Marden et al., 2009b);
> Regret matching (Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000) and variants of regret monitoring (Arslan et al.,
2007);
> Stochastic coordination-2 algorithm and maximum-gain messaging-2 algorithm (Maheswaran
et al., 2005).
We now discuss the various target functions that are used in DCOP algorithms, and then examine
different decision rules and adjustment schedules used in DCOP algorithms.
3.1 State evaluations
The way in which a local iterative approximate best-response algorithm searches the solution
space is, in the largest part, guided by the target function used by agents to evaluate their choice of
state. The most straightforward approach is to directly use the payoffs given by the utility func-
tions to evaluate states. Some shortcomings of this approach, such as slow convergence, poor
search and sub-optimal solutions, are addressed by more sophisticated specifications of the
algorithm’s target function. These include using measures of expected payoff, average regret, and
aggregated utilities. The next subsection addresses using immediate payoffs as a target function,
while subsequent ones examine the more sophisticated target functions.
3.1.1 Immediate payoff and change in payoff
As noted above, the simplest target function that a DCOP algorithm can use to evaluate its
strategy is to directly use its private utility function, ui(si, s2i), producing typical ‘hill-climbing’ or
‘greedy’ behaviour. This leads the system to a Nash equilibrium, which corresponds to a local
potential-maximizing point. The best-response dynamics is the most well-known example of such
an approach.
Furthermore, many algorithms, including the DSA, the distributed breakout algorithm and the
maximum-gain messaging algorithms, use the amount to be gained by changing strategy as a
target function. This is a simple perturbation of the utility function achieved by finding the
difference between the current state’s value and the value of all other possible states. For many
decision rules, using either the gain or the raw utility function as an input will produce the same
result. However, when it is useful to differentiate between those states that improve payoff and
those that do not, or when the decision rule used can only take non-negative values as inputs, gain
in payoff is the appropriate target function.
Agents using this target function to update their evaluation of states only need to observe the
current state of their neighbours to run the algorithm, and do not need to communicate any
further information. However, the use of such a target function can often result in slow convergence.
3.1.2 Expected payoff over historical frequencies
In order to speed up convergence, an algorithm can use the expected payoff for each state over
historical frequencies of state profiles as a target function. These can be constructed in at least two
different ways, either by maintaining an infinite memory of past actions, as in the fictitious play
algorithms, or a finite memory, as in variants of adaptive play.
First, we consider the infinite memory case, and the fictitious play target function in particular.
Let agent j’s historical frequency of playing s0
j, be defined as
qt
s0
j ¼
1
t
X t 1
t¼0
Ifs0
j ¼ st
jg;
424 A. C. CHAPMAN ET AL.where Ifs0
j ¼ st
jg is an indicator function equal to one if s0
j is the strategy played by j at time t, and
zero otherwise. This may be stated recursively as
qt
s0
j ¼
1
t
Ifs0
j ¼ st 1
j gþð t 1Þqt 1
s0
j
hi
:
Now, qt
s0
j may be interpreted as i’s belief that its opponent, j, will play strategy s0
j at time t.A g e n ti’s
belief over each of its opponents’ actions as a vector of historical frequencies of play for each j6¼i is
qt
j ¼
qt
s1
j
. .
.
qt
s
jSjj
j
2
6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 5
and i’s belief over all of its opponents’ actions is the set of vectors qt
 i ¼f qt
jg
j2Nni. Following this, i’s
expected payoff for playing s0
i,g i v e nqt
 i,i st h e n :
FPt
iðs0
i;qt
 iÞ¼
X
s i2S i
uiðs0
i;s iÞ
Y
sj2s i
qt
sj
"#
; ð6Þ
where, in general, S2i5[j6¼iANSj. However, note that in any hypergraphical game, such as a
DCOP game, q2i and S2i may be replaced with qv(i) and Sv(i), respectively.
The classical fictitious play and smooth fictitious play algorithms use this measure of expected
payoff as a target function. Variations of fictitious play that use other methods to update the
agent’s belief state have been suggested, many of which are contained in the broad family of
generalized weakened fictitious play processes (Leslie & Collins, 2006). For example, in situations
where an agent can only observe its payoff and has no knowledge of its neighbours’ actions, the
expected payoff may be calculated as the average received payoff to each action. This is known as
cautious or utility-based fictitious play (Fudenberg & Levine, 1995), and, as noted by Arslan et al.
(2007), is effectively a payoff-based reinforcement learning algorithm. Additionally, Crawford
(1995) suggests a weighted fictitious play process for highly variable environments, in which the
contribution of past observations to an agent’s belief are exponentially discounted.
A similar infinite memory process, called JSFP, was introduced by Marden et al. (2009b). In
this process, each agent keeps track of the frequency with which its opponents play each joint
strategy s2i, rather than their individual strategy frequencies. In this case, let i’s belief over its
opponents’ joint-strategy profiles, qt
iðs iÞ, be given by the fraction of times it observes each joint
profile. Each agent’s expected payoff given this belief is then:
JSFPt
iðs0
i;qt
 iÞ¼
X
s i2S i
qt
iðs iÞuiðs0
i;s iÞ:
This can be expressed more simply as
JSFPt
iðs0
i;qt
 iÞ¼
1
t
X t
t¼1
uiðs0
i;st
 iÞ;
where st
 i is the strategy profile of the agent’s opponents at time t. Furthermore, this target
function can be specified recursively, which only requires agents to maintain a measure of the
expected payoff for each state, rather than the full action history:
JSFPt
iðs0
i;qt
 iÞ¼
1
t
uiðs0
i;st
 iÞþð t 1ÞJSFPt 1
i ðs0
i;qt 1
 i Þ
  
; ð7Þ
where uiðsi;st
 iÞ is the fictitious payoff to i for each element of Si given its opponents’ profile at t.
Marden et al. (2009b) show that the classical fictitious play and the JSFP target functions
coincide in all two-player games. As an example of the usefulness of the hypergraphical game
representation, we now show that the classical fictitious play and the JSFP target functions are
identical in all binary hypergraphical games (i.e. every local game is a two-player game). To begin
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from local games:
FPt
iðs0
i;qt
 iÞ¼
X
g2Gi
X
s i2S i
u
g
iðs0
i;s iÞ
Y
sj2s i
qt
sj
"#
:
Now, in a binary hypergraphical game, the product term is redundant because an agent has only
one opponent in each local game, so using qt
s0
j ¼ 1
t
Pt 1
t¼0 Ifs0
j ¼ st
jg, we can rewrite the above as
FPt
iðs0
i;qt
 iÞ¼
X
g2Gi
X
sjg2Sjg
u
g
iðs0
i;sjgÞ
1
t
X t 1
t¼0
Ifsjg ¼ st
jgg;
where j
g is i’s opponent in g. The expression above can be simplified because the combination of
summing over all Sjg and the indicator function can be replaced by taking the average of the
payoffs actually received in each local game over time. This gives
FPt
iðs0
i;qt
 iÞ¼
1
t
X t 1
t¼0
X
g2Gi
u
g
iðs0
i;st
jgÞ;
which, like the JSFP target function, admits a recursive specification:
FPt
iðs0
i;qt
 iÞ¼
1
t
X
g2Gi
u
g
iðs0
i;st
jgÞþð t 1ÞFPt 1
i ðs0
i;qt 1
 i Þ
"#
¼
1
t
uiðsi;st
 iÞþð t 1ÞFPt 1
i ðs0
i;qt 1
 i Þ
  
:
This form of classical fictitious play for binary hypergraphical games is identical to the definition
of the JSFP target function stated in Equation (7).
We now consider a class of processes that evaluate the expected payoff for each state over
historical frequencies of state profiles computed from samples taken from a finite memory, called
adaptive play (Young, 1993). In adaptive play, agents maintain a finite history over their oppo-
nents’ actions, and construct an estimate of their mixed strategies by sampling from this history.
Each individual only has a finite memory, of length m, and recalls the previous m actions taken by
opponents. On each play of the game, each individual takes a sample of size krm from this
memory, and computes an estimate of its opponents’ actions from this sample. That is, i’s belief
over j’s actions, q(sj)
i,t, is given by the proportion of times that j has played strategy sj in the sample
of size k. Then, as in fictitious play, i’s expected payoff for playing s0
i, given q
i;t
 i, is given by
APt
iðs0
i;q
i;t
 iÞ¼
X
s i2S i
uiðs0
i;s iÞ
Y
sj2s i
qi;t
sj
"#
: ð8Þ
All of the adaptive play variants use this type of state evaluation, with various constraints on the
relative values of m and k. In particular, spatial adaptive play was described in Young (1998) as a
variation of adaptive play in which both the memory m and the sample size k are 1, and in which
only a single agent updates its strategy each time step.
The fictitious play, JSFP and adaptive play target functions have the same communication
requirements as algorithms that use the immediate payoff for an action as a target function,
because at each point in time each agent only needs to know the values of s2i in order to update its
evaluation of each of its states.
3.1.3 Average regret for past actions
Another approach that can be used to speed up convergence is to measure the average ‘regret’ for
not taking an action, where the regret measure for a particular strategy at a particular time is the
difference between the payoff that would have been received for playing that strategy at time t and
the strategy that was actually chosen at t. The average of these differences over the history of
426 A. C. CHAPMAN ET AL.repeated play is the average regret for not adopting that particular strategy consistently over the
entire history of play:
ARt
i ¼
1
t
X t
t¼1
uiðs0
i;st
 iÞ uiðst
i;st
 iÞ
  
:
This target function is also known as external regret. Like the measure of expected payoff based on
joint strategies discussed above, the average regret target function can be specified recursively,
only requiring the agents to maintain a measure of average regret for each state:
ARt
i ¼
1
t
uiðs0
i;st
 iÞ uiðstÞþð t 1ÞARt 1
i
  
: ð9Þ
Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) use this target function to construct their regret matching algorithm,
and use it to characterize an entire class of adaptive strategies (Hart & Mas-Colell, 2001a). It is
also used as the target function for a distributed simulated annealing method for finding the Nash
equilibria of games (La Mura & Pearson, 2002). Like fictitious play, many variants of the method
of updating regrets have been suggested. For example, a variation of average regret for situations
where an agent can only observe its own payoff is known as internal regret (Blum & Mansour,
2007). This method calculates regret as the difference between the average payoff for choosing
each state in the past and the received payoff for the state selected at a particular time. In this way
it is analogous to cautious fictitious play.
Another example, proposed by Arslan et al. (2007), is a regret-based target function in which
past regrets are weighted by a constant value. In other words, past regrets are exponentially
discounted, or the agents have ‘fading memory’:
WRt
i ¼ r uiðsi;st
 iÞ uiðstÞ
  
þð 1 rÞWRt 1
i ; ð10Þ
where (12r) is the discount factor, 0,rr1.
Again, this target function uses the same observations as algorithms that use the immediate
payoff, fictitious play, JSFP and adaptive play target functions payoff for an action as a target
function, because at each time step, an agent only needs to know the values of s2i in order to
update its regret for each of its states.
3.1.4 Aggregated immediate payoffs
One inconvenient aspect of the above target function specifications is that they are prone to
converging to sub-optimal equilibria (in the absence of some ergodic process such as a random
perturbation to payoffs, as will be discussed in Section 3.2). A number of algorithms avoid this
problem by using aggregated payoffs to evaluate states. However, these algorithms have sig-
nificantly increased communication requirements, as agents pass information regarding the value
of each state, rather than just indicating their current state.
The maximum-gain messaging-2 algorithm and stochastic coordination-2 algorithm both use a
pairwise aggregate of local utility functions to evaluate the joint state of any two agents, i and j:
uij ¼
X
ck2Ci
uckðsi;sj;s fi;jgÞþ
X
ck2Cj
uckðsi;sj;s fi;jgÞ 
X
ck2Ci\Cj
uckðsi;sj;s fi;jgÞ; ð11Þ
where the final term adjusts for the double counting of any constraints shared by the agents.
This target function allows the agents to evaluate synchronized state changes, and can be used to
avoid the worst Nash equilibria in the system by converging only to 2-optima. As mentioned in
Section 2.2, Pearce and Tambe (2007) show that the worst-case 2-optimum solution to a DCOP
game is greater than that for a Nash equilibrium, or 1-optimum. Thus, this result implies that an
algorithm that uses a pairwise aggregated target function has a higher lower bound solution than
any algorithm that only converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, Maheswaran et al. (2005) propose two families of k-coordinated algorithms—the
maximum-gain messaging-k and stochastic coordination-k algorithms—that use locally aggre-
gated utilities for coalitions of k agents, which each converge to an element of their respective set
of k-optima. However, although the number of messages communicated at each step to calculate
the aggregated utilities increase linearly with the number of neighbours each agent has, the size
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constructing algorithms that aggregate the utilities of large coalitions of agents infeasible.
3.2 Decision rules
A decision rule is the procedure that an agent uses to map the output of its target function to its
choice of strategy. The decision rule used by most DCOP algorithms is either the argmax or
argmin functions, or probabilistic choice functions. The choice between these two serves an
important purpose, as it determines whether the algorithm follows a hill-climbing trajectory or is
stochastic. In the former case, the algorithm produced may converge quickly—or may even be
anytime—but it may not be able to escape from the basin of attraction of a local maximum.
On the other hand, adding ergodicity allows the algorithm to escape from the basin of attraction
of a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium (or local maximum of the potential function), but at the cost of
sometimes degrading the solution quality. Proportionally probabilistic decision rules map payoffs
through a probabilistic choice function to a mixed strategy (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998). As such,
states with a higher-valued target function are chosen with greater probability, but states with lower
payoffs than the current state are sometimes chosen. This allows the agents in the system to escape
local optima. However, it also means that the algorithm is no longer an anytime optimization
algorithm. Two such probabilistic choice functions are the linear and multinomial logit choice
models. The simulated annealing decision rules add ergodicity by probabilistically moving to a lower
utility state in proportion to its distance from the current state’s utility, while always moving to
states with higher utility. Finally, the e-greedy decision rule, commonly used in machine learning,
selects a state with the highest valuation with probability (12e) and chooses uniformly from the
remaining states with probability e. We now consider these rules in more detail.
3.2.1 Argmax and argmin decision rules
The argmax function (or, equivalently, the argmin function) returns the state with the highest
(lowest) valued target function. Two variations of this decision rule are present in the literature,
which differ in how they handle multiple situations where multiple states correspond to the highest
value of the target function. These two variants of the argmax function are discussed in the context
of the DSA in Zhang et al. (2005), where the algorithms are named DSA-A and DSA-B,
respectively. In the first, which we call argmax-A, if the agent’s state at t21 is one of the states that
maximizes the target function, then it is the state selected at t. Otherwise, a new state is randomly
chosen with equal probability from the set of target function maximizing states. That is, the agent
only changes its state if it improves the value of its target function. In the second variant, argmax-B,
an agent randomly selects a new state from the set of target function maximizing states, without
regard for the state at t21. Note that in non-degenerate games, every best response is unique, so
the two variants of the argmax function behave identically.
A benefit is that using the argmax function in conjunction with an immediate reward target
function and a suitable adjustment schedule (such as in the maximum-gain messaging algorithm) is
that the resulting algorithm can be ‘anytime’, in that each new solution produced is an
improvement on the last. However, one potential drawback of this technique is its dependence on
initial conditions, even when the algorithm is not anytime. It is possible that the initial random
configuration of states places the system outside the basin of attraction of an optimal Nash
equilibrium, meaning that an algorithm using the argmax decision rule can never reach an optimal
point. To avoid this scenario, a probabilistic decision rule may be used instead.
3.2.2 Linear probabilistic decision rules
The linear probabilistic decision rule produces a mixed strategy with probabilities in direct proportion
to the target value of each state:
Prsi ¼
uiðsi;st
 iÞ
P
si2Si
uiðsi;st
 iÞ
:
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appears to be quite a substantial limitation, the linear probabilistic choice rule is useful in certain
circumstances. For example, the regret matching algorithm uses the linear probabilistic choice
function with negative regrets set equal to zero, so that they are chosen with zero probability (Hart &
Mas-Colell, 2000). Another example is the better-reply dynamic, in which an agent randomly chooses
a new state from those which (weakly) improve its payoff (Mezzetti & Friedman, 2001).
3.2.3 Multinomial logit decision rules
One probabilistic decision rule that can accept negative input is the multinomial logit decision rule
(Anderson et al., 1992), known in statistical mechanics as the Boltzmann distribution:
PrsiðZÞ¼
eZ 1uiðsi;st
 iÞ
P
si2Si
eZ 1uiðsi;st
 iÞ : ð12Þ
Here states are chosen in proportion to their reward, but their relative probability is controlled by
h, a temperature parameter. If h50 then the argmax function results, while h5N produces a
uniform distribution across strategies, which results in the state of the system following a random
walk. Depending on the specifics of the problem at hand, the temperature can be kept constant or
may be decreased over time. If an appropriate cooling schedule is followed, the later case is referred
to as a ‘greedy in the limit with infinite exploration’ decision rule in the online reinforcement learning
literature (Singh et al., 2000). The multinomial logit choice function is used in typical specifications
of smooth best response, spatial adaptive play (Young, 1998), and smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg
& Levine, 1998; Hofbauer & Sandholm, 2002).
3.2.4 Simulated annealing decision rules
The simulated annealing decision rule is a probabilistic decision rule that works by randomly
selecting a new candidate state, k, and accepting or rejecting it based on a comparison to the
current state (Metropolis et al., 1953; Kirkpatrick et al., 1983). All improvements in the target
function are accepted, while states that lower the value of the target function are only accepted in
proportion to their distance from the current state’s value. For example, the case where the target
function is given by the agent’s private utility function gives the following decision rule:
PrsiðZÞ¼
1i f uiðk;s iÞ uiðsi;s iÞ;
eZ 1ðuiðk;s iÞ uiðsi;s iÞÞ otherwise;
(
ð13Þ
where ui(k, s2i) and ui(si, s2i) are the candidate and the current state’s payoffs, respectively.
As with the multinomial logit choice model (Equation 12), h is a temperature parameter. If h50
then only states that improve the target function are accepted, while h5N means that all
candidate states are accepted, and consequently, as with the multinomial logit function, the state
of the system follows a random walk. The temperature may be kept constant, resulting in an
analogue of the Metropolis algorithm (Metropolis et al., 1953), or may be decreased over time as
in a standard simulated annealing optimization algorithm (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983). Distributed
simulated annealing has been proposed as a global optimization technique for DCOPs (Arshad
& Silaghi, 2003), and a simulated annealing algorithm based on average regret has been suggested
as a computational technique for solving the Nash equilibria of general games (La Mura &
Pearson, 2002).
3.2.5 The e-greedy decision rule
One particularly common decision rule used in online reinforcement learning is known as e-greedy.
Under this rule, an agent selects a state with maximal expected reward with probability (12e), and
a random other action with probability e, that is,
Prsið Þ¼
1   if si ¼ argmax½uiðk;s iÞ ;
k2Si
  otherwise:
:
(
ð14Þ
Iterative approximate best-response algorithms for DCOPs 429Like the multinomial logit decision rule, the exploration parameter, e, can be kept constant or may
be decreased over time. Under specific conditions on the rate of decrease, the later case is another
example of a ‘greedy in the limit with infinite exploration’ decision rule (Singh et al., 2000). This
decision rule is used in many variations of adaptive play (e.g. Young, 1993).
3.3 Adjustment schedules
An adjustment schedule is the mechanism that controls which agents adjust their state at each
point in time. The simplest schedule is the ‘flood’ schedule, where all agents adjust their strategies
at the same time. Beyond this, adjustment schedules can be divided into two groups: random or
deterministic. The former are typically run by each agent independently, and can produce
sequential or parallel actions by agents. The latter often require agents to communicate infor-
mation between themselves in order to coordinate which agent adjusts its strategy at a given point
in time, with priority usually given to agents that can achieve greater gains or are involved in more
conflicts. Other times the ordering is decided upon in a preprocessing stage of the algorithm.
3.3.1 Flood schedule
Under the flood schedule, all agents adjust their strategies at the same time. This schedule is in
essence the Jacobi iteration method (Press et al., 1992). It is frequently used in applications of local
greedy algorithms (e.g. Matthews & Durrant-Whyte, 2006), and in implementations of fictitious
play (e.g. Leslie & Collins, 2006) and some variants of adaptive play (e.g. Young, 1993).
A problem commonly observed with algorithms using the flood schedule, particularly greedy
algorithms, is the presence of ‘thrashing’ or cycling behaviour (Zhang et al., 2005). Thrashing
occurs when, as all agents adjust their states at the same time, they inadvertently move their joint
state to a globally inferior outcome. Furthermore, it is possible that a set of agents can become
stuck in a cycle of adjustments that prevents them from converging to a stable, Nash equilibrium
outcome. In theory, the potential for these types of behaviours to occur means that convergence
cannot be guaranteed, while in practice they are detrimental to the performance of any algorithm
using the flood schedule.
3.3.2 Parallel random schedules and inertia
Parallel random adjustment schedules are simply variations of the flood schedule, in which each
agent has some probability p of actually changing its state at any time step. In the computer
science literature on DCOPs, p is known as the ‘degree of parallel executions’ (Zhang et al., 2005),
whereas in the game theory literature it is commonly referred to as choice ‘inertia’ (e.g. Mezzetti &
Friedman, 2001; Marden et al., 2009b).
Now, this type of adjustment schedule does not ensure that thrashing is entirely eliminated.
However by selecting an appropriate value of p, thrashing and cycling behaviour can be minimized,
producing an efficient algorithm with parallel execution without increasing the communicational
requirements. Furthermore, inertia is essential to the convergence proofs of various processes, such
as the better-reply dynamics and JSPF. This is the adjustment schedule used by the DSA, regret
matching, and JSFP with inertia.
3.3.3 Sequential random schedules
The group of adjustment schedules that we call sequential random schedules involve randomly
giving one agent at a time the opportunity to adjust its strategy, with agents selected by some
probabilistic process. The motivation for using this adjustment schedule is grounded in the
convergence proofs for many of the adaptive procedures taken from the game theory literature. In
particular, the finite improvement property of potential games directly implies that agents that
play a sequence of ‘better responses’ converge to a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps.
This property is used to prove the convergence of spatial adaptive play and a version of Fictitious
Play with sequential updating (Berger, 2007).
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subgraphs, where thrashing is not a concern, or for the execution of algorithms whose convergence
can be guaranteed without asynchronous moves. However, they do ensure that agents do not cycle
or thrash, which is a risk with using the flood or parallel random adjustment schedules.
In practice, there are a number of ways to implement this type of schedule. A particularly
straightforward approach, which ensures that all agents have an opportunity to adjust their state is
given by dividing time into segments, with each agent randomly selecting a point from a uniform
distribution over the segment at which to adjust its strategy. Agents then adjust their states
sequentially and in a random order, which satisfies the assumptions of the theoretical convergence
results. However, such a schedule may depend on an external or synchronized clock. This type of
schedule is essentially a form of Gauss–Seidel iteration, in which the order of updating is shuffled
each cycle (Press et al., 1992). We refer to this schedule as a shuffled sequential schedule. Another
simple approach would be to give each agent a mechanism that triggers action according to a
probabilistic function of time, such as an exponential distribution, which can be run on an internal
clock. In this process the probability of any two agents adjusting their state at the same time is
zero. This could be called a sequential random exponential schedule. A final suggestion is to use
token-passing to maintain sequential updates.
3.3.4 Maximum-gain priority adjustment schedule
The maximum-gain messaging algorithm takes its name from the type of adjustment schedule it
uses (Yokoo & Hirayama, 1996; Maheswaran et al., 2005). This preferential adjustment protocol
involves agents exchanging messages regarding the maximum gain they can achieve. If an agent
can achieve the greatest gain out of all its neighbours, then it implements that change, otherwise it
maintains its current state. The maximum-gain messaging adjustment schedule avoids thrashing or
cycling, as no two neighbouring agents will ever move at the same time.
3.3.5 Constraint priority adjustment schedule
A second preferential adjustment schedule, the constraint priority adjustment schedule, works by
allocating each agent a priority measure based on the number of violated constraints it is involved
with. This is the type of adjustment schedule used by the APO algorithm.
4 Local approximate best-response algorithm parametrization
In this section we discuss how the different components of a DCOP algorithm, as identified in
Section 3, affect the quality and timeliness of the solutions it produces. As an overview, Table 1
presents the parameterization of the main local approximate best-response DCOP algorithms
highlighted in Section 3: two versions of the DSA (DSA-A and DSA-B), the maximum-gain
messaging algorithm (MGM), the better-reply dynamic with inertia (BR-I), spatial adaptive play
(SAP), distributed simulated annealing (DSAN), fictitious play (FP) and smooth fictitious play
(smFP), JSFP with inertia (JSFP-I), adaptive play (AP), regret matching (RM), weighted regret
monitoring with inertia (WRM-I), the stochastic coordination-2 algorithm (SCA-2), and the
maximum-gain messaging-2 algorithm (MGM-2). In this table, the relationships between the
algorithms are clearly shown, in terms of the components used to construct each of them.
Before beginning the detailed discussion, we define some of the terms we use in the analysis. In
particular, we say an algorithm converges in finite time if there exists a value T after which the joint
state of the agents is guaranteed to be a Nash equilibrium. An algorithm almost surely converges if
the probability of the agents’ joint state being a Nash equilibrium converges to 1 as the number of
time steps tends to infinity. An algorithm converges in distribution if the distribution over joint
states converges to some specified distribution as time tends to infinity. Typically, the specified
distribution is the Boltzmann distribution over the joint state with temperature h that maximizes
the global utility. Note that almost-sure convergence and convergence in distribution do not
prevent the algorithm from moving arbitrarily far from a specified outcome, but only that these
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Target function Memory Decision rule Adjustment schedule
DSA-A ui(si, s2i) — argmax-A Parallel random (p)
DSA-B ui(si, s2i) — argmax-B Parallel random (p)
MGM ui(si, s2i) — argmax-B Preferential: maximum gain
BR-I ui(si, s2i) — argmax-B Flood
SAP ui(si, s2i) — Logistic (h) Sequential random
DSAN ui(si, s2i) — Sim. annealing (h) Parallel random (p)
FP
P
s i2S i
uiðs0
i;s i
Q
sj2s i
qt
sj
"#
Opponents’ freq. of play argmax-B Flood
smFP
P
s i2S i
uiðs0
i;s i
Q
sj2s i
qt
sj
"#
Opponents’ freq. of play Logistic (h) Flood
JSFP-I 1
t
uiðsi;st
 iÞ
þðt 1ÞJSFPt 1
i
  
Average expected utility argmax-A Parallel random (p)
RM 1
t
uiðsi;st
 iÞ uiðstÞ
þðt 1ÞARt 1
i
  
Average regrets Linear prob
1 Parallel random (p)
WRM-I
r
uiðsi;st
 iÞ uiðstÞ
þð1   rÞWRt 1
i
  
Discounted average regrets Linear prob
1 or logistic
1 (h) Parallel random (p)
SCA-2
 
P uiðsi;s iÞþujðsj;s jÞ
ck2Ci\Cj
uckðsi;sj;s fi;jgÞ
— argmax-A Parallel random (p)
MGM-2
 
P uiðsi;s iÞþujðsj;s jÞ
ck2Ci\Cj
uckðsi;sj;s fi;jgÞ
— argmax-B Preferential: maximum
DCOP5distributed constraint optimization problem; DSA5distributed stochastic algorithm; MGM5maximum-gain messaging; BR-I5better-reply dynamic with
inertia; SAP5spatial adaptive play; DSAN5distributed simulated annealing; FP5fictitious play; smFP5smooth fictitious play; JSFP-I5joint-strategy fictitious play
with inertia; RM5regret matching; WRM-I5weighted regret monitoring with inertia; SCA-25stochastic coordination-2 algorithm.
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.moves occur with decreasing probability (Grimmett & Stirzaker, 2001). An algorithm is called
anytime if at each time step the solution it produces is at least as good as the one produced at the
previous time step. Finally, a joint strategy is called absorbing if it is always played after the first time
it is played, as is standard in the stochastic processes literature (e.g. Grimmett & Stirzaker, 2001).
We now move on to discuss in detail how the algorithms are related and where they differ, and
furthermore, how this affects their behaviour and the solutions they produce. In the process, we
will sketch several convergence proof techniques, and will extend some existing convergence
proofs to cover algorithms with similar structures. First, we analyze those algorithms that use
immediate reward or change in payoff as a target function. This allows us to demonstrate clearly
how different decision rules and adjustment schedules affect the convergence properties of the
algorithms. We then discuss algorithms that use recursive averaging measures, such as expected
reward or regret, as target functions.
4.1 Immediate reward and gain-based algorithms
In this section we discuss those algorithms that use immediate payoff, change in payoff, or
aggregated measures of either to evaluate states. In so doing, we will demonstrate three techniques
of proving the convergence of a DCOP algorithm, which exploit the existence of a potential
function in three different ways. Importantly, these techniques can be extended to similar algo-
rithms that comprise common components. As such, we discuss the algorithms in groups based on
their convergence proofs, beginning with MGM, which has the anytime property and converges to
Nash equilibrium. Second, we consider DSA and BR-I, which rely on almost-sure convergence
to Nash equilibrium. Third, we discuss SAP and DSAN, which, by virtue of the particular
probabilistic decision rules they employ, can be shown to converge in distribution to the global
maximum of the potential function. Finally, we discuss the convergence of the MGM-k and SCA-k
to k-optima, and relate their convergence to that of MGM and DSA, respectively.
4.1.1 Anytime convergence of MGM
We begin with MGM. In ordinal potential games, MGM converges to a Nash equilibrium and is
an anytime algorithm (Maheswaran et al., 2005). This is because agents act in isolation (i.e. none
of their neighbours change strategy at the same time), so their actions only ever improve their
utility, which implies an improvement in global utility (by Equation 5). Furthermore, by the same
reasoning, the finite improvement property ensures that this algorithm converges to a Nash
equilibrium in finite time
10.
4.1.2 Almost-sure convergence of DSA and BR-I
Although similar in construction to MGM, neither DSA nor BR-I are anytime, as it is possible
that agents who change state at the same time find themselves in a worse global state than they
began in. However, using almost-sure convergence, we can show the following: DSA-A (DSA
using argmax-A) almost surely converges to a Nash equilibrium, and DSA-B and BR-I almost
surely converge to a strict Nash equilibrium. Although similar results have been published (e.g.
Young, 1998; Mezzetti & Friedman, 2001), for pedagogical value, we present a proof of the
convergence of DSA-B to a strict Nash equilibrium, which we use as a template for sketching other
convergence proofs. We will refer back to the steps presented in this proof when discussing the
convergence of other algorithms in future sections.
PROPOSITION 7 If a strict Nash equilibrium exists, then DSA-B almost surely converges to a strict
Nash equilibrium in repeated potential games.
10 Maheswaran et al. (2005) show that MGM is anytime and converges to an element in the set of Nash
equilibrium in DCOP games directly, without using a potential game characterization of the problem.
Iterative approximate best-response algorithms for DCOPs 433Proof. A strict Nash equilibrium is an absorbing strategy profile under DSA-B’s dynamics; that is,
once in a strict Nash equilibrium, no agent will change their strategy. Now, for any non-Nash
equilibrium outcome, there exists a minimal improvement path, terminating at a Nash equilibrium.
Denote the length of the longest minimal improvement path from any outcome to a Nash equilibrium
LG. The rest of this proof involves showing that as t-N, the probability that the complete longest
minimal improvement path has been traversed goes to 1.
In a game consisting of N agents using DSA-B to adapt their state, for any probability of
updating pA(0, 1), the probability that only one agent changes state at a particular time step is
given by p(12p)
N21. Consider the probability that at some time step, the agent selected to change
its state is able to improve its utility (i.e. is part of an improvement path). This probability is at
least p(12p)
N21/N, which is its value when at that time step, the improvement step is unique. Thus,
at any time, t, the probability of traversing the longest minimal improvement path of length LG,i s
at least:
q ¼
0 toLG;
pð1 pÞ
N 1
N
hi L
G
t   LG:
8
<
:
Note that whenever tZLG, q is greater than zero, because pA(0, 1) and N and LG are finite.
Following this, in a sequence of t steps, the probability of traversing the longest minimal
improvement path and converging to a Nash equilibrium at time t, pconv(t), simply follows a
geometric distribution, with positive probabilities beginning at time step LG:
pconvðtÞ¼qð1 qÞ
t:
Consequently, we can express the cumulative probability of converging by t, Pconv(t)—the sum of
pconv(t)—as
PconvðtÞ¼
X t
t¼1
pconvðtÞ¼
qð1 ð1 qÞ
tþ1Þ
1 ð1 qÞ
¼ 1 ð1 qÞ
tþ1:
Then, as t-N,( 1 2q)
t11-0, so the probability that a complete longest minimal improvement
path is traversed goes to 1 as the number of rounds tends towards infinity. &
The convergence proof for DSA-A follows the same argument, except that all Nash equilibria
are absorbing. For BR-I, the proof is identical. This is because the only difference between DSA-B
and BR-I is that the former selects the best response while the latter selects a better response, and
these cases are treated in the same way with respect to the finite improvement property: That is,
the finite improvement property ensures that all improvement paths are finite, whether they be
best-response or better-response paths.
We have now described two methods of proving the convergence of a DCOP algorithm. The
first shows that an algorithm is anytime, and that it improves until it reaches a Nash equilibrium.
The second technique begins by characterizing the absorbing states of an algorithm. Then, by the
finite improvement property, at any time in the future there is some non-negative probability of
the algorithm entering the absorbing state. Therefore, the algorithm almost surely converges.
The algorithms discussed so far have produced individual best or better responses. However,
one common drawback of these approaches is that if these algorithms converge to sub-optimal
equilibria, they cannot escape. One technique used to get around this problem is to use stochasticity
in the decision rule. A second is to aggregate agents’ utilities and allow coordinated, joint changes in
state. These two techniques are discussed in the following two sections.
4.1.3 Convergence of SAP and DSAN to the global optimum
Both SAP and DSAN use a stochastic decision rule to escape from local maxima. Specifically, by
using the logistic or simulated annealing decision rules, they can move between basins of attraction
of local maxima.
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X
s2S
ugðsÞPrðsÞ Z
X
s2S
PrðsÞlogPrðsÞ;
which is given by the Boltzmann distribution with temperature parameter h (Young, 1998,
Chapter 6). By setting h low, this algorithm approximates the optimal joint state, and at any point
in time has a high probability of having the optimal configuration.
Furthermore, regarding both SAP and DSAN, when the temperature parameter of these decision
rules are decreased over time according to an appropriate annealing schedule (i.e. hp1/logt), they
are known to converge to the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the potential function (Kirkpatrick
et al., 1983; Young, 1998; Benaim et al., 2005, 2006). That is, they converge to the global optimum.
4.1.4 Convergence of MGM-k and SCA-k to k-optima
A second technique used to escape local maxima is to use a target function that aggregates local
utilities to evaluate joint-strategy changes by teams of agents. This is the approach used by MGM-2
and SCA-2, which both check for all joint changes in state by pairs of agents (as in Equation 11),
and the families of MGM-k and SCA-k algorithms generally.
Similar to MGM, under MGM-2, only isolated pairs of agents act at a given step, so any
change only improves the global utility, and the algorithm only terminates when it reaches a
2-optimum, rather than a Nash equilibrium (Maheswaran et al., 2005). The almost-sure convergence
of SCA-2 is proven using the same method as DSA, except that the absorbing states are the set of
2-optima. However, note that bounds on worst-case 2-optima only exist for DCOPs containing
unary and binary constraints, so the benefits of using MGM-2 in DCOPs with constraint arity
greater than 2 are unclear. Nonetheless, these proofs can easily be extended to convergence to
k-optima for the corresponding algorithms.
4.2 Algorithms using averaging target functions
In this section, we discuss averaging algorithms that use variations of the expected payoff over
historical frequencies of actions and average regret target functions. We begin with the fictitious
play family of algorithms, before considering regret-based algorithms.
4.2.1 Fictitious play algorithms
The term ‘fictitious play’ is often used to denote a family of adaptive processes that use the
expected payoff over historical frequencies of actions as a target function (Fudenberg & Levine,
1998). Now, all versions of fictitious play that use historical frequencies as a target function and
the argmax decision rule (regardless of the adjustment schedule used) have the property that if
play converges to a pure-strategy profile, it must be a Nash equilibrium, because if it were not,
some agent would eventually change their strategy.
The standard fictitious play algorithm, described in Table 1 as FP, uses the expected payoff over
historical frequencies as a target function (Equation 6) and the argmax-B decision rule, and agents
follow the flood schedule and adjust their state simultaneously. A proof of the convergence of FP to
Nash equilibrium in weighted and exact potential games is given by Monderer and Shapley (1996a).
Specifically, in repeated potential games, this algorithm converges in beliefs; that is, each agents’
estimate of its opponents’ strategies, which are used to calculate each of its own strategies’ expected
payoffs, converge as time progresses. This process induces some stability in an agent’s choice of
strategy because an agent’s current strategy is based on its opponents’ average past strategies, which
means that an agent’s belief moves through its belief space with decreasing step size. Consequently
thrashing and cycling behaviour is reduced, compared to, say, DSA or the best-response dynamics.
The same target function and adjustment schedule are used in smFP as in FP, but, typically, the
multinomial logit decision rule substitutes for the argmax rule. However, unlike SAP or DSAN,
this substitution does not imply that the algorithm converges to the global maximum of the potential
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Sandholm, 2002). Nonetheless, in practice, using the logit decision rule does, on average, produce
better quality solutions than the argmax rule. Leslie and Collins (2006) show how to analyze smFP
when the temperature parameter reduces over time and smFP approximates FP in the limit.
The dynamics of all versions of JSFP are quite different to that of FP. Specifically, strict Nash
equilibria are absorbing for any algorithm that uses the JSFP target function (Equation 7) and
argmax-A as a decision rule. This is because if agents have beliefs that induce them to play a strict
Nash equilibrium, these beliefs are reinforced each time the strict Nash equilibrium is played.
To date, convergence to Nash equilibrium has not been shown for a version of JSFP that operates
on the flood schedule. However, regarding the version that operates on the parallel random
schedule, JSFP with inertia (JSFP-I), its proof of convergence to strict Nash equilibria is based on a
similar argument to that for the convergence of DSA (Marden et al., 2009b). Given that strict Nash
equilibria are absorbing, all that needs to be shown is that at any given time step, JSFP-I has some
positive probability of visiting a strict Nash equilibrium. Now, under JSFP-I any unilateral change in
strategy climbs the potential. Then, as with DSA, when inertia is added to the agents’ choice of
action (i.e. by using the parallel random adjustment schedule), the probability that a sequence of
unilateral moves numbering at least the length of the longest improvement path occurs is strictly
positive. Therefore, over time, the probability of entering the absorbing state approaches one. As
with FP, because agents’ current strategies are based on average past joint strategies, the JSFP-I
process produces relative stability in an agent’s choice of strategy, and as a consequence thrashing
and cycling behaviour is reduced. Additionally, because JSFP-I uses the parallel random schedule,
the number of messages required each time step to run the algorithm is less than FP.
4.2.2 Adaptive play algorithms
The AP variants we consider here are all of those in which an agent takes a sample of size k from a
finite memory of the previous m plays of the game to evaluate their expected rewards for state
(Equation 8) and chooses a state using the e-greedy choice rule, and all of the agents operate using
the flood schedule (note that this excludes SAP). A subset of these algorithms can be shown to
converge to a strict Nash equilibrium, using results from perturbed Markov processes (Young,
1993, 1998). The key elements of the proof are as follows.
First, call the particular joint memory maintained by the agents at t, the memory configuration.
Note that if e50, then the memory configurations containing only strict Nash equilibria are
absorbing for any krm. That is, with no random play, if all agents’ memories contain only a
single strict Nash equilibrium, that equilibrium will be played from there on. Second, using a
resistance tree argument (Young, 1993), it can be shown that from any memory configuration, for
any 1/|v(i)|e.0 (where v(i) are i’s neighbours), the probability of moving along an improvement
path towards a strict Nash equilibrium is greater than that for a movement away. As such, over
time the probability of traversing an entire (finite) improvement path goes to 1. This result holds
provided that the sample size krm/(LG12), where LG is the longest minimal improvement path
from any joint-action profile to a strict Nash equilibrium. Building on this, as e-0, the probability
of the memory configuration consisting entirely of one strict Nash equilibrium also goes to 1.
Then, in the limit, this strict Nash equilibrium is absorbing.
4.2.3 Regret matching and weighted regret monitoring algorithms
Like the variations of fictitious play, algorithms that use the average regret for past actions to
evaluate states also come in many different forms. Here we limit our attention to the regret
matching (RM) and weighted regret monitoring with inertia (WRM-I) algorithms, which show
contrasting behaviour as a result of a small difference in the target function they employ.
RM uses the average regret for past actions (Equation 9) in conjunction with a linear probabilistic
decision rule (which assigns zero probability to strategies with negative regret values) to decide on
as t r a t e g y ,w i t ha g e n t sa d j u s t i n gb yt h ep a r a l l el random schedule. RM converges to the set of
correlated equilibria (a generalization of Nash equilibria) in all finite games (Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000),
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using this target function, an agent’s worst performing strategies are ruled out earliest, and
although the use of a linear probabilistic decision rule does cause some thrashing, the presence of
negative regrets lessens these effects.
On the other hand, WRM-I does converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in potential
games (Arslan et al., 2007). This algorithm uses a target function that discounts past regrets by a
constant weight (Equation 10) and the parallel random schedule, and may be specified with any
probabilistic decision rule that only selects a strategy from those with non-negative average regret
(e.g. linear
1 or logit
1). In the case of the linear
1 decision rule, WRM-I differs from RM only in
the target function used. The proof of its convergence is similar to DSA and JSFP, and proceeds as
follows. First, note that the target function used in WRM-I discounts past regrets (Equation 10).
As a consequence, if a given strict Nash equilibrium is played consecutively a sufficient number
of times, it will be the only strategy for which any agent has a positive regret. Additionally, the
converse also holds: if each agent has only one strategy with non-negative regret, the corre-
sponding joint strategy must be a Nash equilibrium. Second, the decision rules used in WRM-I
only select from those strategies with non-negative regret. Therefore, if the joint regret-state is ever
at a point where only one joint strategy has a positive regret for every agent, the algorithm will
continue to select that joint strategy. Let us call this region in the agents’ joint regret-space an
equilibrium’s joint regret sink. Third, the final step in the proof is to show that there is some strictly
positive probability that the agents’ joint regret enters an equilibrium’s joint regret sink. This is
achieved via the finite improvement property and the use of inertia, in an argument similar to that
used in the proof of convergence of DSA. Note that if past regrets are not discounted, then
convergence to a Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed, and the algorithm may not even converge
to a stationary point (as is the case in RM).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we focused on local approximate best-response algorithms for DCOPs, for optimi-
zation in domains where communication is difficult, costly or impossible, and in which optimality
can be traded off against timeliness or computational and communicational burden. Specifically,
our key contribution is a framework for analyzing local approximate best-response algorithms for
DCOPs—that is, algorithms that operate by having agents exchange messages that contain only
their strategy. Our framework captures many algorithms developed in both the computer science
and game theory literatures. Moreover, we argue that the appropriate solution concept for the class
of local approximate best-response algorithms is the Nash equilibrium condition. Given this, our
framework is built on the insight that when formulated as non-cooperative games, DCOPs form a
subset of the class of potential games. In turn, this allowed us to apply game-theoretic methods to
analyze the convergence properties of local approximate best-response algorithms developed in the
computer science literature.
In general, our framework is based on a three-stage decomposition that is common to all local
approximate best-response DCOP algorithms. Given an appropriate trigger, an individual agent
enters a state evaluation stage, which produces some measure of the desirability of each state. This
is followed by a decision on which action to take, based on the preceding state evaluations. Then,
the system-wide process that controls which agent adjusts its state at each point is given by an
adjustment schedule. We populate our framework with algorithm components, corresponding to
the three stages above, that are used in existing algorithms, and which can be used to construct
novel algorithms.
Our framework can assist system designers by making the pros and cons of the various DCOP
algorithm configurations clear. To illustrate this, we constructed three novel hybrid algorithms from
the components identified in our parameterization. We evaluated these hybrids alongside eight
existing algorithms taken from both the computer science and game theory literatures. Our
experimental results show that an algorithm’s behaviour is accurately predicted by identifying its
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an argmax decision rule converge to a Nash equilibrium, but by varying the adjustment schedule, a
designer may trade off between convergence time and communication use. Thus, a system designer
may use our framework to tailor a DCOP algorithm to suit their mix of requirements, whether they
be high quality solutions (bute.g. in the presence of bandwidth restrictions), rapid convergence (such
as in real-time settings), or low communication costs (e.g. in the presence of resource constraints
such as battery life). Furthermore, we expect most of our experimental results to generalize to other
problems that fall within the class of hypergraphical potential games.
Generally in field of DCOPs, the main problems requiring attention involve extending the
basic, static model with known payoffs and lossless communication to encompass the real-world
aspects of typical DCOP application domains. In more detail, the most salient of these aspects can
be broken into the following groupings:
Online learning of unknown rewards: online learning of reward functions poses a difficult
problem in DCOPs, particularly if coordinated search of the joint-action space is not possible. It is
important to consider the differences in approaches to the problem that are needed if the goal is to
maximize the long-term reward (as is often addressed in Markov decision processes) or to find a
‘good enough’ solution quickly (as in optimal stopping problems). This problem can be further
extended by considering the case were rewards are not just unknown, but observations of them are
noisy, or even stochastic.
Dynamic problems: DCOPs have proven to be very useful for describing static problems, but
their usefulness for dynamic and stochastic problems is not clear. There is, however, scope for
exporting techniques for DCOPs to decentralized Markov decision processes and partially-
observable Markov decision processes in order to identify tractable classes of those problems and
to, subsequently, develop algorithms based on DCOP solution techniques. Furthermore, if
decentralized optimization mechanisms that produce timely solutions are desirable in many static
scenarios, then there is an even greater demand for principled decentralized approximation
heuristics for real-time sequential decision-making in dynamic scenarios, and we believe the
approaches developed here represent a first step in developing such techniques.
Communication: the model of communication adopted in this paper is a natural, although naive
one. Communication in real-world applications of DCOPs is lossy, noisy, delayed and otherwise
asynchronous, and has not been systematically addressed. Similarly, we assume communication
takes place over a network defined by the constraint graph. How relaxing this assumption, to
consider cases where agents do not have a direct communication link with all of the agents their
utility depends on, affects the efficacy of existing approaches is unknown.
APPENDIX A
The following pseudocode describes several of the algorithms discussed in this paper. The pseu-
docode states the computations carried out by an individual agent, and unless otherwise stated, the
algorithms (including their various adjustment schedules) are implemented by each agent running
the stated procedure at every time step. In all that follows, we drop the sub-script i because the
pseudocode refers to an agent’s internal processes. We denote an agent’s strategy sAS and its
target function’s value for strategy k as stateValue(k) or stateRegret(k), as appropriate. An
agent’s neighbours are indexed jAv, with their joint-strategy profile notated sv. Finally, an agent’s
immediate payoff for a strategy k, given its neighbours’ joint-strategy profile is written u(k, sv).
The algorithms listed here are the maximum-gain messaging algorithm (MGM), the DSA using
the argmax-B decision rule (DSA-B), better-response with inertia (BR-I), spatial adaptive play
(SAP), fictitious play (FP), smooth fictitious play (smFP), joint-strategy fictitious play with inertia
(JSFP-I), and weighted regret monitoring with inertia (WRM-I).
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currentReward5u(s5currentState, sv)1
for k51:K 2
stateGain(k)5u(s5k, sv) – currentReward 3
end for 4
bestGainState5argmax
k
½stateGain  5
bestGainValue5stateGain(bestStateGain) 6
sendBestGainMessage[allNeighbours, bestGainValue] 7
neighbourGainValues5getNeighbourGainValues[allNeighbours] 8
if bestGainValue.max[neighbourGain] then 9
newState5bestGainState 10
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState] 11
end if 12
Distributed Stochastic Algorithm (DSA-B)
currentValue5u(s5 currentState, sv)1
for k51:K 2
stateRegret(k)5u(s5k, sv) – currentValue 3
end for 4
candidateState5argmax
k
½stateRegret  5
If rand[0,1]rp 6
newState5candidateState 7
end if 8
if newState6¼currentState 9
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState] 10
end if 11
Better-Response with Inertia (BR-I)
currentValue5u(s5currentState, sv)1
for k51:K 2
stateRegret(k)5max[u(s5k, sv) – currentValue,0] 3
end for 4
normFactor5
PK
k¼1 stateRegret 5
randomNumber5rand(0, 1) 6
for k51:K 7
mixedStrategyCDF(k)5 1
normFactor
Pk
l¼1 stateRegret(l) 8
if randomNumberrmixedStrategyCDF(k) then 12
candidateState5k9
break for loop 10
end if 11
end for 12
if rand[0,1]rp 13
newState5candidateState 14
end if 15
if newState6¼currentState 16
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState] 17
end if 18
In SAP the agents adjust their state in a random sequence. In practice, there are a number of
ways to implement this type of schedule, however, the simplest is to randomly select an agent to
run the stated procedure. Note this usually means some agents may be given more than one
opportunity to adjust their state in a particular time step, while other agents may have none.
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currentValue5u(s5currentState, sv)1
for k51:K 2
stateRegret(k)5u(s5k, sv)2currentValue 3
end for 4
for k51:K 5
statePropensity(k)5exp[h
21stateRegret(k)] 6
end for 7
normFactor5
PK
k¼1 statePropensity(k) 8
randomNumber5rand(0, 1) 9
for k51:K 10
mixedStrategyCDF(k)5 1
normFactor
Pk
l¼1 statePropensity(l) 11
if randomNumberrmixedStrategyCDF(k) then 12
newState5k1 3
break for loop 14
end if 15
end for 16
if newState6¼currentState 17
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState] 18
end if 19
In FP and smFP, |v| is the number of neighbours an agent has, qj is a vector of the frequencies
with which neighbour j has played each strategy kj in the past, Ifkj ¼ st
jg is an indicator vector
with an element equal to one for the state kj played by j at time t and zero everywhere else, and
H ¼
Qjnuj
j¼1 jSjj is the size of the agent’s neighours’ joint-strategy space.
Fictitious Play (FP)
for j51:|v|1
qt
j ¼ 1
t ½Ifkj ¼ st
jgþð t 1Þqt 1
j   2
end for 3
t5t114
for k51:K 5
for h51:H 6
E½uðs ¼ k;sh
nÞ  ¼ uðs;sh
nÞ
Q
sh
j 2sh
n qt
j 7
end for 8
stateValue(k)5
PH
h¼1 E½uðs ¼ k;sh
nÞ  9
end for 10
newState5argmax
k
½stateValue  11
if newState6¼currentState 12
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState] 13
end if 14
Smooth Fictitious Play (smFP)
for j51:|v|1
qt
j ¼ 1
t ½Ifkj ¼ stgþð t 1Þqt 1
j   2
end for 3
t5t114
for k51:K 5
for h51:H 6
E½uðs ¼ k;sh
nÞ  ¼ uðs;sh
nÞ
Q
sh
j 2sh
n qt
j 7
end for 8
stateValue(k)5
PH
h¼1 E½uðs ¼ k;sh
nÞ  9
end for 10
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for k51:K 11
statePropensity(k)5exp[h
21 stateValue(k)] 12
end for 13
normFactor5
PK
k¼1 statePropensity(k) 14
randomNumber5rand(0, 1) 15
for k51:K 16
mixedStrategyCDF(k)5 1
normFactor
Pk
l¼1 statePropensity(l) 17
if randomNumberrmixedStrategyCDF(k) then 18
newState5k1 9
break for loop 20
end if 21
end for 22
if newState6¼currentState 23
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState] 24
end if 25
Joint-Strategy Fictitious Play with Inertia (JSFP-I)
for k51:K 1
stateValue(k)5 1
t ½uðs ¼ k;snÞþð t 1ÞstateValueðkÞ  2
end for 3
t5t114
candidateState5argmax
k
½stateValue  5
if rand[0,1]rp 6
newState5candidateState 7
end if 8
if newState6¼currentState 9
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState] 10
end if 11
Weighted Regret Matching with Inertia (WRM-I)
currentValue5u(s5currentState, sv)1
for k51:K 2
avgDiff(k)5ru(s5k, Sv2currentValue1(12r)avgDiff(k)) 3
stateRegret(k)5max[avgDiff(k), 0] 4
end for 5
normFactor5
PK
k¼1 stateRegret 5
randomNumber5rand(0, 1) 6
for k51:K 7
mixedStrategyCDF(k)5 1
normFactor
Pk
l¼1 stateRegret(l) 8
if randomNumberrmixedStrategyCDF(k) then 12
candidateState5k9
break for loop 10
end if 11
end for 12
if rand[0,1]rp 13
newState5candidateState 14
end if 15
if newState6¼currentState 16
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState] 17
end if 18
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